Authors
Alex Silk
University of Birmingham
Abstract
This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues.
Keywords modals  weak necessity modals  strong necessity modals  ought  counterfactuality  performativity  factivity  context-sensitivity  presupposition
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Do Things with Modals.Matthew Mandelkern - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):115-138.
Generics and Weak Necessity.Ravi Thakral - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-28.

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