Assertion: knowledge is enough
Synthese 193 (10) (2016)
Abstract
Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion. This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and Lackey’s purported quality-driven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey’s argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown’sAuthor Profiles
DOI
10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y
My notes
Similar books and articles
Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
What I Learned in the Lunch Room about Assertion and Practical Reasoning.Rachel R. McKinnon - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):565-569.
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):813-821.
Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):653-658.
In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.
Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.
Analytics
Added to PP
2015-09-22
Downloads
135 (#94,328)
6 months
6 (#132,731)
2015-09-22
Downloads
135 (#94,328)
6 months
6 (#132,731)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):269-293.
Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology.Mona Simion - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):891-916.
The C account of assertion: a negative result.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):125-137.