Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689 (2019)

Abstract
In recent literature, a very popular position about the normativity of assertion claims that standards for epistemically proper assertion vary with practical context, while standards for knowledge do not. This paper shows this claim is strongly incompatible with the received value-theoretic view regarding the relationship between the axiological and the deontic: one of the two has to go.
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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