Philosophical Issues 30 (1):311-323 (2020)

Authors
Mona Simion
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge.
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12187
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.

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