Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181 (2019)

Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
Keywords Deflationism  Truthmaking  Deflationary theory of truth  Truthmakers  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02273-y
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
The Question of Realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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The Best Thing About the Deflationary Theory of Truth.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.

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