Deflationism and truthmaking

Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.

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Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):109-131.
Truth without Dependence.Robert Trueman - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):89-121.
Pragmatism about Truth-Makers.John Capps - 2022 - Contemporary Pragmatism 19 (4):350-370.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

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