Defending Truthmaker Non‐Maximalism

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):288-291 (2014)
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Abstract

Jago argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don't exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago's point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago's challenge

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Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Truthmakers.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity.İlhan İnan - 2022 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.

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References found in this work

How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.
How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.

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