Defending Truthmaker Non‐Maximalism
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):288-291 (2014)
Abstract
Jago argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don't exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago's point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago's challengeAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1002/tht3.144
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Citations of this work
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
References found in this work
Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Negatives, numbers, and necessity some worries about Armstrong's version of truthmaking.Peter Simons - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):253 – 261.