Analysis:any048 (2018)

Abstract
Several prominent philosophers assume that the so-called ‘Belief–Assertion Parallel’ warrants epistemic norm correspondence; as such, they argue from the epistemic norm governing one to the epistemic norm governing the other. This paper argues that, in all its readings, the belief–assertion parallel lacks the desired normative import.
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1093/analys/any048
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.

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Citations of this work BETA

Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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