Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology

Synthese 198 (15):3553-3564 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,141

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-11

Downloads
123 (#178,510)

6 months
16 (#199,729)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Mona Simion
University of Glasgow
Emma C. Gordon
University of Glasgow

References found in this work

Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 20 references / Add more references