The Monist 87 (3):371--85 (2004)
I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out some of its consequences and show that it withstands the obvious questions it faces. I conclude by mentioning some precedents for this view in Democritus, Kant, and Whitehead, with close variants in Boscovich, Harré, and Markosian.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science|
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Atoms Vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1023-1033.
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