Lying, liars and language

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639 (1992)
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Abstract

This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.

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Citations of this work

Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Non-literal Lies.Emanuel Viebahn - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1367-1380.
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
Externalist Psychiatry.Will Davies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):290-296.

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References found in this work

Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert Morris Gordon - 1987 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
The intent to deceive.Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):143-159.
Prolegomenon to a theory of deception.Winston A. Van Horne - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (2):171-182.

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