Lewy on C. I. Lewis and Entailment

Analysis 38 (3):126 - 129 (1978)
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Abstract

In "meaning and modality" lewy claims the only ground for rejecting disjunctive syllogism as acceptable for entailment is rejection of bivalence. Examining lewis's 'proofs' of the paradoxes of strict implication he suggests the proof of 'if a then (b or not-B)' suppresses a premiss, Restoration of which blocks the paradox, Whereas the proof of 'if (a and not-A) then b' cannot be so blocked. But the paradoxes are dual, So he should have treated them dually by restoring a suppressed disjunct in the consequent of the second. When this is done, The second paradox is blocked and disjunctive syllogism fares no better than the principle lewy discarded

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Peter Simons
Trinity College, Dublin

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