Analysis 76 (1):19-26 (2016)

Authors
Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University
Abstract
Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the motivations for truthmaker theory. Moreover, deflationists can consistently articulate and accept such motivations. Deflationism has no bearing on the plausibility of the truthmaker principle
Keywords Truth  Truthmaking  Deflationism  MacBride
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv081
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References found in this work BETA

Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deflationism and Truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181.
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):109-131.

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