Oxford University Press (2012)

Ori Simchen
University of British Columbia
This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things (or pluralities) involved. The next three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things (aka de re attitudes).
Keywords intentionality  modality  de re and de dicto  essence  cognitive attitudes
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Reprint years 2015
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Call number B105.I56.S56 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199608515   9780198744160   0198744161   0199608512
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