Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392 (2016)

Authors
Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow
Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews
Harmen Ghijsen
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs.
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12077
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge‐First Functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
Theory of Inquiry.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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