Prudence and Anti-Prudence

American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):73 - 86 (1998)
This article identifies both prudence and antiprudence as options for rational people. Building upon Wiggins's "sensible subjectivism," the account offers an analysis of prudential emotions which are not rationally required but whose reasonableness need not be doubted. One result is that skepticism about prudence is avoidable. Another, as shown through examination of some of Parfit's worries about replication, is that prudence is autonomous from metaphysical theories of persons. It is also autonomous from morality, neither prudence nor morality being appropriately subordinated to the other in a theory of rational choice.
Keywords Ethics  Morality  Prudence  Larkin, P  Shields, C
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