Possibilites for divine freedom
Roczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4):93-123 (2016)
Abstract
I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain God’s freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adams’s idea that God’s grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0035-7685
DOI
10.18290/rf.2016.64.4-6
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Citations of this work
Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom.Simon Kittle - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (2):97-115.
Against Synchronic Free Will.Simon Kittle - 2022 - In Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.), The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives. New York: Routledge. pp. 176-194.
Falling From Grace and the Problem of Free Will.Nicole Hassoun - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):194-216.
References found in this work
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
