Rules and mention

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):455-473 (2001)
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Abstract

Lewis Carroll’s well-known parable ”What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” gives rise to a recalcitrant and general form of normative skepticism. I argue that the skeptical position inspired by the story is indeed a distinct form of skepticism, engendered by refusal to recognize that any rule reflected upon may possibly retaining its action-guiding force. I show that the skeptic’s attitude builds upon the familiar fact that our reflection upon sources of psychological influence on us may loosen their grip by affording us reflective distance. I conclude by showing how the equally familiar phenomenon that reflection upon a rule does not automatically drain it of its force can be exploited in a satisfactory response to the skeptic.

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Ori Simchen
University of British Columbia

References found in this work

Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
Varieties of Quotation.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):429-450.

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