Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
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This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.



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Author Profiles

Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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