Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.)
Oxford University Press (2021)
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This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.
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| ISBN(s) | 9780198847205 0198847203 |
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