Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.)
Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
Abstract
This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.Author Profiles
Call number
BD161.R43 2021
ISBN(s)
9780198847205 0198847203
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