Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

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Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
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Chapters BETA
Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor
Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan
Losing Knowledge by Thinking About Thinking.Jennifer Nagel
Competing Reasons.Justin Snedegar

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