Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

& (eds.)
Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
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Abstract

This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.

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BD161.R43 2021

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9780198847205   0198847203

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Chapters

Competing Reasons.Justin Snedegar
Knowledge, Action, Defeasibility.Carlotta Pavese
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan
The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham & Jack C. Lyons
Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking.  (pages 69-92)Jennifer Nagel
Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.  (pages 91–115)Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Reasons for Reliabilism.  (pages 146-176)Bob Beddor
Undercutting Defeat: When it Happens and Some Implications for Epistemology.  (pages 201-222)Matthew McGrath
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.  (pages 223–246)Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant
Perceptual Reasons and Defeat.  (pages 269-284)Mark Schroeder

Similar books and articles

Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 223–246.
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perceptual Reasons and Defeat.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 269-284.
Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 69-92.
Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2449-2466.
Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Defence.Mona Simion - unknown
Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.
Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 91–115.

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Author Profiles

Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Mona Simion
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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