Reformulating the Two Aspects of Justification

Florida Philosophical Review 13 (1):49-59 (2013)

Ryan Simonelli
University of Chicago
In Evidence and Inquiry, Susan Haack presents a dual-aspect account of evidence in which both casual and logical relations play a necessary factor. In this paper, I reformulates how these two aspects fit together to form a comprehensive picture of discursive justification. Drawing from Quine’s work on the “observation sentence,” I show how we can move from causal justifications to inferential justifications. Conversely, I also attempt to show how we can correct and improve our causally justified, noninferential beliefs by challenging and inferentially justifying them. The resulting account should be one in which our beliefs are connected to the world, but one which is non-foundationalist and allows any belief to be called into question.
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In Praise of Observation Sentences.W. V. Quine - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):107-116.

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