Philosophical Studies:1-16 (2018)

Abstract
One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim. Extant arguments in defence of the view are scrutinized and found to rest on value-theoretic inaccuracies. First, the belief-assertion parallel is shown to lack the needed normative strength. Second, I argue that the claim that assertion inherits the norm of belief in virtue of being an expression thereof rests on a failed instance of deontic transmission. Third, the inheritance argument from the norm for action is proven guilty of deontic equivocation. Last but not least, it is argued that, on a functionalist normative picture, assertion and belief are governed by different epistemic norms, in virtue of serving different epistemic functions.
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge‐First Functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
Is Panpsychism Simple?Henry Taylor - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):265-275.

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