Simulations are not models

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue that simulation is the activity of inferring future states. I argue that simulations instantiate models and that models are complexes of representations, so the inference in question makes use of the relations between the representations in a simulation's associated model. It follows that simulations should not be properly considered to be models in general, despite it being the case that they are commonly treated, or referred to, as being models, or even models of a special type, namely dynamic models. Further consequences of this position are also discussed.

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2009-01-28

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References found in this work

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Scientific Theories.Frederick Suppe (ed.) - 1974 - Urbana, University of Illinois Press.
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary Hesse - 1965 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (62):161-163.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.

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