Should expressivists go global?

Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2275-2289 (2023)
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Abstract

Moral expressivists think that moral thoughts and sentences don’t represent or describe the world, at least not in any interesting sense. Global expressivists think that _no_ thoughts or sentences represent the world; local expressivists think that some do and others don’t. Huw Price has influentially argued that local expressivism collapses into global expressivism, due both to the effects of minimalist theories of representation and similar concepts, and to an unappreciated consequence of the success of specific expressivist theories like moral expressivism. In this paper I argue that Price’s arguments don’t succeed. While they can be fixed, doing so makes them miss their intended target. Local expressivists should therefore not be worried by Price’s arguments.

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Matthew Simpson
Central European University

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References found in this work

Being for: evaluating the semantic program of expressivism.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Schroeder.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism.Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams - 2013 - Burlington, VT: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams.
Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.

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