Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context

Oxford University Press (2021)
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Abstract

This work is a manifesto for epistemic independence: the independence of good thinking from practical considerations. It presents a functionalist account of the normativity of assertion in conjunction with an integrated view of the normativity of constative speech acts.

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Mona Simion
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.
Trustworthy artificial intelligence.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-12.
Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Norms of Constatives.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):517-536.
Knowledge and Disinformation.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.

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