Parrhesia 7:4-16 (2009)

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Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):847-870.
Enactive becoming.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):783-809.

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