Synthese 195 (3):1011-1034 (2018)

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Keith Simmons
University of Connecticut
Abstract
In this paper, I raise some interconnected concerns for Paul Horwich’s minimal theory of truth, framed by these three questions: How should the minimal theory be formulated? How does the minimal theory address the liar paradox? What is the explanatory role of the concept of truth? I conclude that we cannot be linguistic or conceptual deflationists about truth.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1135-8
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