Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165 (2013)

Authors
Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue that the different functional properties of these mental states are enough to distinguish them, and that norm-application doesn't help us draw the functional distinctions
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01449.x
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References found in this work BETA

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
On the Aim of Belief.David Velleman - 2000 - In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Direction of Fit.I. Lloyd Humberstone - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):59-83.
On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2003 - In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge. pp. 125--141.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Imagining stories: attitudes and operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):639-664.
Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.

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