Philosophical Issues 29 (1):268-280 (2019)

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Daniel J. Singer
University of Pennsylvania
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Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12153
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
Normativity.J. J. Thomson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):713-715.

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