Ethics and Intuitions

Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352 (2005)

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Abstract
For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics.
Keywords brain imaging  David Hume  ethics  evolutionary psychology  Henry Sidgwick  Immanuel Kant  intuitions  James Rachels  John Rawls  Jonathan Haidt  Joshua D. Greene
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y
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References found in this work BETA

Active and Passive Euthanasia.James Rachels - 1975 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium.Peter Singer - 1974 - The Monist 58 (3):490-517.
An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism.H. J. McCloskey - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (4):466-485.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
How to Debunk Moral Beliefs.Victor Kumar & Joshua May - 2019 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 25-48.

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