Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology

Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289 (2011)

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Abstract
Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.
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DOI 10.1177/1754073911402382
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References found in this work BETA

Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethical Intuitionism and the Linguistic Analogy.Philipp Schwind - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):292-311.
Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.

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