Expressivism and the Value of Truth

Philosophia 40 (4):877-883 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.

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10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7

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Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University

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References found in this work

Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.

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