Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287 (2008)

Authors
Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University
Abstract
This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended
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DOI 10.1080/05568640809485222
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Reasons, Inescapability and Persuasion.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844.
Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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Expressivist Explanations.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):147-177.
Tempered Expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (1).
How Not to Avoid Wishful Thinking.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.

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