Moderate classy pyrrhonian moral scepticism
Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456 (2008)
Abstract
This précis summarizes my book Moral Skepticisms, with emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.553.x
My notes
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Citations of this work
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's moral contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470.
A dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong's moderate pyrrhonian moral scepticism.Gerry Hough - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):457–462.
