Moral expressivism and sentential negation

Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411 (2011)
Abstract
This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to explain why sentences and their negations are inconsistent, and inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of negation (the Semantic Condition). Third, the ability of the account to generalize regardless of the topic of the negated sentence (the Generality Condition). The paper discusses three accounts of negation available to moral expressivists. The first—the dominant commitment account—fails to meet the Fregean Condition. The two remaining accounts—commitment semantics and the expression account—satisfy all three conditions. A recent argument that the dominant commitment account is the only option available to expressivists is considered and rejected.
Keywords Negation  Expressivism  Frege–Geach problem
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.

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