Oxford University Press (2006)
All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism--the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory,--"moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism"--which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$12.99 used (87% off) $74.17 new (22% off) $86.32 direct from Amazon (10% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1031.S56 2006|
|ISBN(s)||0195187725 9780195187724 9780195342062|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):413-438.
The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.
Similar books and articles
Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (2):133-144.
Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments.Mark van Roojen - forthcoming - In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470.
On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism.Jonathan Smith - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads118 ( #40,758 of 2,158,315 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #32,217 of 2,158,315 )
How can I increase my downloads?