Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):155-175 (2004)

Abstract
In this article I shall be supporting two main claims. The first is that the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism lies in where they locate ethical correctness. The second is that generalism, although to be preferred to particularism, is not the final resting place for ethical correctness. Ultimately, ethical correctness resides in ethical theories that provide the rationale for generalism. Particularism is presented as a theory that allows attention to be paid to specific cases and shows a sensitivity to the particular case. Generalism, with its appeal to moral principles, is supposed to lack this sensitivity to specific cases. I argue that although this might be true of subsumptive generalism, it is not true of what I call judgmental generalism. This latter type of generalism retains an appeal to moral principles while requiring sensitivity to the particular case. I consider Kantian ethics as an example of this sort of generalism. Furthermore, I support the claim that this judgmental generalism is to be preferred to particularism. I argue against a prominent form of particularism, put forward by Jonathan Dancy, based on an appeal to the holism of reasons. This doctrine involves the claim that the value of a complex whole is not necessarily identical with the value of its parts. I show that Dancy’s discussion of this involves inconsistencies and also appears to incorporate subsumptive generalism. This statement of particularism is ultimately incoherent.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/174046810400100203
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,811
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Particularizing Particularism.Roger Crisp - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. pp. 23--47.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice.Brendan Larvor - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
A Particularistic Moral Mind.Pierpaolo Marrone - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):110-124.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults. [REVIEW]Alan Thomas - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.
Generalism Without Foundations.Manuel Hernández-Iglesias - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):71-86.
Moral Particularism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - In Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. pp. 247-260.
Particularism and Default Reasons.Pekka Väyrynen - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):53-79.
Aesthetic Principles.Oliver Conolly & Bashshar Haydar - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):114-125.
Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW]Vojko Strahovnik - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (21):512-518.
Ethics Without Reasons?Roger Crisp - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
Moral Particularism: An Introduction.Simon Kirchin - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):8-15.
The Riddle of Aesthetic Principles.Vojko Strahovnik - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):189-208.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
73 ( #151,066 of 2,463,140 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,149 of 2,463,140 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes