Even though it has always seemed to me so evidently erroneous, the view that we must test our normative theories against our intuitions has continued to have many adherents [...]. But now it faces its most serious challenge yet, in the form of Peter Unger's Living High and Letting Die. On one level this book is an attempt to tighten the argument I advanced in 'Famine, affluence and morality'. Unger argues that we do wrong when we fail to send money to overseas aid organizations that will use it to save many lives. But he does much more than that. He makes his argument by presenting a wide variety of examples and telling us about the intuitive responses that he had found most people - especially his students - have to them. The responses are very difficult to reconcile with each other. Unger then offers explanations for them. His explanations are devastating for the view that we should take our intuitive responses to particular cases as the test of a sound theory, because the explanations show that our intuitive judgments are based on things that are obviously of no moral significance at all. Here is an example. Unger uses some variants on the 'trolley problem', much discussed by philosophers during the past thirty years. The problem is posed by a runaway trolley rolling down the railway track, on course to kill several innocent people further down the line. In one version of the problem you can throw a switch that will divert the trolley down another track, where it will kill just one innocent person. In another version, there is no switch, but you could push a very heavy person off a bridge in front of the trolley. The heavy person will be killed, but the trolley will be stopped and the six people will be saved. Most people think that you should throw the switch, thus causing one to die, rather than six; but they think it would be wrong to push the heavy person off the bridge into the path of the trolley. To a consequentialist this difference is puzzling. In both achieve this outcome? A Kantian, however, can claim that the responses show that our intuitions are in line with the Kantian idea that it is wrong to use someone as a means, even if by doing so there is a net saving of innocent human life.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem.Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini & Salvatore Rizzello - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):789-804.
Similar books and articles
Moral Theorizing and Intuition Pumps; Or, Should We Worry About People’s Everyday Intuitions About Ethical Issues?James McBain - 2005 - The Midwest Quarterly 46 (3):268-283.
A Reply to Thomson on 'Turning the Trolley'; a Case Study Illustrating the Importance of a Hohfeldian Analysis of the 'Mechanics' of Rights.Alec D. Walen & David Wasserman - unknown
Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):662-672.
Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence.Peter K. Unger - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Judgments About Altruistic Self-Sacrifice: When Philosophical and Folk Intuitions Clash.Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):73-94.
The Armchair and the Trolley: An Argument for Experimental Ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.
Chinese and Westerners Respond Differently to the Trolley Dilemmas.Henrik Ahlenius & Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2012 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 12 (3-4):195-201.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads119 ( #41,594 of 2,178,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #39,547 of 2,178,180 )
How can I increase my downloads?