Propositional clothing and belief

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive of discourses that express propositions. If there is nothing more to a mental state being a belief than it being characteristically expressed by sentences that are propositionally clothed then the version of expressivism which accepts that moral discourse is propositionally clothed (‘quasi-realism’) is self-refuting. Fortunately for quasi-realists, this view of belief, which I label ‘minimalism’, is false. I present three arguments against it and dismiss two possible defences (the first drawn from the work of Wright, the second given by Harcourt). The conclusion is that the issue between expressivists and their opponents cannot be settled by the mere fact that moral discourse wears propositional clothing.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
946 (#16,292)

6 months
102 (#55,026)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Recent work in expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1141-1169.
An Empirical Argument against Moral Non-Cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jen Wright - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
The steps from doing to saying.Simon Blackburn - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):1-13.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Ethics and the limits of philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 60 references / Add more references