Reasons, inescapability and persuasion

Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844 (2016)

Authors
Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University
Abstract
This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral reasons. The account also suggests a general recipe for explanations of conceptual features of moral reason statements. (Published with Open Access.).
Keywords Expressivism  External reasons  Inescapability  Moral reasons  Williams
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0639-x
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.
What’s So Queer About Morality?Luke Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics:1-19.
Expressivism and Collectives.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):833-861.

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