Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172 (2014)

Daniel J. Singer
University of Pennsylvania
The traditional solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem say that Beauty should have either a sharp 1/3 or sharp 1/2 credence that the coin flip was heads when she wakes. But Beauty’s evidence is incomplete so that it doesn’t warrant a precise credence, I claim. Instead, Beauty ought to have a properly imprecise credence when she wakes. In particular, her representor ought to assign \(R(H\!eads)=[0,1/2]\) . I show, perhaps surprisingly, that this solution can account for the many of the intuitions that motivate the traditional solutions. I also offer a new objection to Elga’s restricted version of the principle of indifference, which an opponent may try to use to collapse the imprecision
Keywords Epistemology  Formal epistemology  Sleeping Beauty   Imprecise bayesianism  Bayesianism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0429-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Reason and the Grain of Belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.

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Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.

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