Ratio 19 (2):249–260 (2006)

Authors
Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University
Abstract
The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question.
Keywords Expressivism  Minimalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00323.x
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.
Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

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