Unequal Vividness and Double Effect

Utilitas 25 (3):291-315 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is accepted because of unreliable processes of belief-formation, making it unacceptably likely to be mistaken. We accept the doctrine because we more vividly imagine intended consequences of our actions than merely foreseen ones, making our aversions to the intended harms more violent, and making us judge that producing the intended harms is morally worse. This explanation fits psychological evidence from Schnall and others, and recent neuroscientific research from Greene, Klein, Kahane, and Schaich Borg. It explains Mikhail and Hauser’s “universal moral grammar” and an interesting phenomenon about Double Effect cases noted by Bennett. When unequally vivid representations determine our decisions, we typically misjudge the merits of our options and make mistakes. So if Double Effect is a product of unequal vividness, it is likely to be mistaken. This argument, I claim, fits Berker’s specifications for good empirically grounded arguments in ethics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Aristotle and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2014 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8 (1):20.
A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.
The Doctrine of Double Effect and Affirmative Action.Jeff Jordan - 1990 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (2):213-216.
Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect.Jeff McMahan - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):201-212.
The Doctrine of Double Effect.Neil Delaney - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):397-406.
Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics.Neil Levy - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (2):3-9.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-07

Downloads
3,363 (#2,771)

6 months
152 (#28,229)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore

References found in this work

Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.

View all 17 references / Add more references