Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons

In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 158-168 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

John McDowell claims that virtuous people recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire. I show that the phenomena he cites are better explained if desire makes us see considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons. The salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. I offer a desire-based account of how we can follow uncodifiable rules of common-sense morality and how some reasons can be silenced in deliberation. I conclude by arguing that animals can be virtuous by having the right desires

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Silencing Desires?Attila Tanyi - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Two Sides of 'Silencing'.Jeffrey Seidman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):68 - 77.
The Moral Grip.Chrisoula Andreou - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
The desires of others.Berislav Marušić - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400.
Desires, reasons, and causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model.Attila Tanyi - 2006 - Dissertation, Central European University
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Non-contingent reasons.Crystal Thorpe - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):159-169.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
The Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 195--219.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-05-29

Downloads
1,878 (#5,177)

6 months
165 (#20,551)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The emotional construction of morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Schroeder.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.

View all 20 references / Add more references