Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):278-299 (2015)

Authors
Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Nietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman.
Keywords Nietzsche  subjectivism  virtue
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1073576
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

View all 69 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Nietzsche and Value Creation: Subjectivism, Self-Expression, and Strength.Harold Langsam - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (1):100-113.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-07

Total views
1,365 ( #2,207 of 2,340,047 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
96 ( #5,223 of 2,340,047 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes