What feelings can't do

Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135 (2006)
Abstract
Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data
Keywords Emotion  Epiphenomenalism  Feeling  Intentionality  Intuition  Metaphysics  Mind  Mood  Representation  Damasio, Antonio R  Le Doux, Joseph
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00308.x
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Citations of this work BETA
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Towards a Theory of Mood Function.Muk Yan Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):179-197.
The Mood-Emotion Loop.Muk Yan Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3061-3080.

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