What feelings can't do

Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135 (2006)
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Abstract

Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data

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Laura Sizer
Mount Holyoke College

Citations of this work

The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
The Mood-Emotion Loop.Muk Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3061-3080.
Towards a Theory of Mood Function.Muk Yan Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):179-197.

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