Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135 (2006)
Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data
|Keywords||Emotion Epiphenomenalism Feeling Intentionality Intuition Metaphysics Mind Mood Representation Damasio, Antonio R Le Doux, Joseph|
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References found in this work BETA
Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.E. Griffiths Paul - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
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