Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243 (2010)
This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
|Keywords||Darwinism Moral Realism Moral Scepticism Moral Epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Citations of this work BETA
Debunking Morality: Lessons From the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Do the Evolutionary Origins of Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge?Kevin Brosnan - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.
A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.
Natural Kinds as Categorical Bottlenecks.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):925-948.
Meta‐Normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.
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