Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519 (2010)
In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§ 9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view.
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The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):9-31.
Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation.Thomas Hurka - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):111-134.
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