David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559 (2013)
Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role of providing us with doxastic instructions guided by our epistemic aims. Understanding the nature of seemings allows us to underwrite recent epistemological work by Michael Huemer, and shows why he was right to claim that seemings are the source of all justification. I then look at some objections both to my arguments regarding the connection between seemings and justification, and to Huemer’s related “Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism”. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-21 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9830-2 Authors Matthew Skene, Syracuse University, 8330 E. Quincy Ave., I-307, Denver, CO 80237, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
|Keywords||Seemings Huemer Justification Self-defeat Phenomenal conservatism|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
John Stuart Mill (2009). Utilitarianism. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
William Alston (2005). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Citations of this work BETA
Samuel Taylor (2015). Is Justification Easy or Impossible? Getting Acquainted with a Middle Road. Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.
Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
Aaran Burns (forthcoming). A Phenomenal Conservative Perspective on Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-15.
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