A Solution to the Problem of Indeterminate Desert

Mind 121 (481):37-65 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A desert-sensitive moral theory says that whether people get what they deserve, whether they are treated as they deserve to be treated, plays a role in determining what we ought to do. Some popular forms of consequentialism are desert-sensitive. But where do facts about what people deserve come from? If someone deserves a raise, or a kiss, in virtue of what does he deserve those things? One plausible answer is that what someone deserves depends, at least in part, on how well he meets his moral requirements. The wicked deserve to suffer and the decent do not. Shelly Kagan (2006) has argued that this plausible answer is wrong. But his argument for that conclusion does not succeed. I will show how to formulate a desert-sensitive moral theory (and also a desert-sensitive version of consequentialism) on which this answer is correct

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Brute luck equality and desert.Peter Vallentyne - 2003 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and justice. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 169--185.
Desert and equality.Richard J. Arneson - 2006 - In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. pp. 262--293.
Desert and distributive justice in a theory of justice.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (1):131–143.
The Geometry of Desert.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Persons, punishment, and free will skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
What do we deserve?: a reader on justice and desert.Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod (eds.) - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Desert and justice.Serena Olsaretti (ed.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral Responsibility and Merit.Matt King - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-18.
Responsibility, Desert, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and distributive justice. Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-15

Downloads
152 (#124,752)

6 months
37 (#99,581)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bradford Skow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Desert.Owen McLeod - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The morality-welfare circularity problem.William Lauinger - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1959-1981.
Altruism and Desert.Sean Clancy - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):310-325.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The additive fallacy.Shelly Kagan - 1988 - Ethics 99 (1):5-31.
Desert and justice.Serena Olsaretti (ed.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Desert.Jeffrie G. Murphy & George Sher - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):280.
Desert.George Sher - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):409-411.

View all 12 references / Add more references