Preferentism and the paradox of desire

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2009 (3):1-17 (2009)
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Abstract

The paradox of desire is an objection to desire-satisfaction, or preferentist, theories of welfare. In a nutshell, the objection goes like this. I can certainly desire that I be badly off. But if a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare is true, then—under certain assumptions—the hypothesis that I desire that I be badly off entails a contradiction. So much the worse for desire-satisfaction theories of welfare.

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Bradford Skow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Tragedy.G. Currie - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):632-638.
On the Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm.Kritika Maheshwari - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):965-980.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.

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