Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief

Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369 (2004)
Abstract
Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to a better grasp of how representational content can be carried by systems without an explicit representation
Keywords Belief  Content  Implicit  Naturalism  Science  Structural
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DOI 10.1086/421538
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